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Talking to the shameless? Sexual violence and mediation in intrastate conflicts 
 
Robert Ulrich Nagel* 
Conflict Analysis Research Centre 
University of Kent  
 
Forthcoming in the Journal of Conflict Resolution 
 
To what extent does sexual violence influence the likelihood of conflict management 
in intrastate conflicts? Despite a growing body of research that explores conflict-
related sexual violence, the literature presents little insight on its effects on conflict 
resolution. Extending feminist IR theory to intrastate conflicts and applying a gender 
lens to the power to hurt argument, I argue that when rebel sexual violence is public 
knowledge the likelihood of conflict management increases because the state 
perceives it as a threat to its masculinity. I systematically test this argument on all 
intrastate conflict years from 1990 to 2009 using the Sexual Violence in Armed 
Conflict (SVAC) and the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset. The results provide 
robust support for the argument. This presents an important refinement of traditional 
rationalist conflict bargaining theories and opens new avenues for the research and 
practice of conflict management. 
																																																								
* IÕd like to express my sincere gratitude to Govinda Clayton, Andrea Den Boer, Phil 
Cunliffe, Ismene Gizelis, Libby Wood, Sabrina Karim, Katariina Mustasilta, Marina 
Petrova, Hilary Matfess, Ellen Chapin, and the anonymous reviewers for their 
insightful feedback on previous drafts. A previous version was presented at the annual 
APSA convention 2017 in San Francisco. 
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Introduction 
In 2010 the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) agreed to peace 
talks with a local militia called Mai Mai Sheka. These talks began after, in the span of 
three days, the group reportedly raped 387 civilians (Autesserre 2012, 217). Faced 
with this massive sexual violence the government decided to negotiate. Some suggest 
that the DRC government is not an outlier, but that governments are generally more 
likely to accept peace talks when rebels perpetrate sexual violence that attracts 
international attention (Autesserre 2012). Accordingly, this article explores the 
question: to what extent does sexual violence influence conflict management? 
Sexual violence in conflict is now widely recognized as a threat to 
international security and an increasing number of studies explore its causes and 
variations (Wood 2006, 2009; Cohen 2013, 2016; Cohen and Nords 2014; 2015). 
Although sexual violence has often been described as strategic and Ôrape as a weapon 
of warÕ is a dominant narrative (Crawford 2017), there is a robust literature on the 
diverse reasons behind conflict-related sexual violence.1 At the same time, we know 
very little about the effects of sexual violence on conflict processes.  
One recent study starts to shed some light on the consequences of sexual 
violence in conflict by examining the relationship between sexual violence and 
conflict outcomes (Chu and Braithwaite 2018). Chu and Braithwaite argue that 
conflicts involving sexual violence are more likely to end in negotiate agreements 
because actors perpetrating this type of violence are organizationally weak, less likely 
to secure military victory, and thus more likely to agree on a deal to salvage anything 
from the conflict. This illustrates that effects of sexual violence can be distinct from 
perpetratorsÕ motivations and thus should be examined without conflating observed 
outcome with underlying intent. In line with this, I focus on effects of rebel sexual 
violence without assuming strategic intent. Besides contributing to the nascent 
literature on the effects of sexual violence, this study more broadly adds an innovative 
argument to the body of literature examining the effects of civilian victimization on 
conflict processes and outcomes (Wood and Kathman 2014; Thomas 2014; Fortna 
2015).  
																																																								
1 For a comprehensive critique of the Ôstrategic argumentÕ see Wood (2014) and 
Cohen (2016) 
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Drawing on feminist IR theory and bringing together disparate literatures on 
sexual violence, gender, and conflict management, I argue that reports of rebel sexual 
violence increase the likelihood of mediation because they emasculate the state. This 
emasculation has two components: first, rebel sexual violence demonstrates statesÕ 
failure to fulfill their masculine protection responsibility, and second, when reported, 
this failure becomes a public loss of face. This two-fold humiliation presents a 
conflict cost that outweighs the costs of accepting mediation. Thus, rebel sexual 
violence increases the likelihood of mediation. Employing a gender lens refines 
traditional rationalist bargaining theories. In drawing on feminist IR theory and 
positivist methodology, this article contributes to the emerging literature bridging 
these two approaches (Karim and Beardsley 2017).  
 Mediation offers benefits such as increased legitimacy to non-state actors, 
while primarily presenting costs to states. Thus, governments are likely to resist the 
inclusion of an intermediary until expected costs of continued fighting outweigh the 
costs associated with mediation. Insurgents hoping to overcome the inherent power 
asymmetry of civil war usually welcome third-party involvement. I contend that when 
rebel sexual violence is public knowledge, incumbent governments perceive it as 
particularly costly because it threatens their masculinity. Reports of sexual violence 
expose statesÕ inability to protect their constituents, which presents an increase in 
conflict costs. Mediation accordingly should be more likely when there are reports of 
rebels perpetrating sexual violence.  
On the other hand, the asymmetric relationship between belligerents grants 
governments a veto player function and denies rebels the possibility of initiating a 
mediation process. This means that if there are reports of state sexual violence and 
rebels call for mediation, the decision to enter into mediation rests with the 
government. Thus, I expect that if there are reports of state sexual violence it will not 
affect the likelihood of mediation. 
 I begin by discussing what factors contribute to mediation onset in civil wars. 
Then I examine the gendered dynamics underpinning the power to hurt logic and 
argue that reports of sexual violence emasculate the government. I quantitatively test 
my argument using logistic regression models to examine 118 intrastate conflicts 
drawn from the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2002). The 
dataset includes 746 conflict years between 1990 and 2009, of these 222 feature a 
mediation event. Mediation data are drawn from an updated version of the Civil War 
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Mediation dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 2011). The Sexual Violence 
in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset is used to capture reports of sexual (Cohen and 
Nords 2014). The analysis indicates that conflict years in which rebels are reported 
to perpetrate sexual violence are more likely to see the onset of mediation, while 
reports of sexual violence by the state have no significant influence. Following the 
quantitative analysis, I discuss Sierra Leone as a crucial case to test the theory.  
 
Conflict management - mediation onset 
Why do conflict parties start to talk? 
When intrastate conflicts erupt, governments should enjoy military and economic 
advantages (Gent 2011). Comparing rebel strength to governmentsÕ capabilities 
shows that in 204 intrastate conflicts only approximately 13% of rebel groups are 
stronger than or can match governmentsÕ capabilities (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and 
Salehyan 2013). This asymmetry is reflected in the fact that rebels win only 9% of 
conflict episodes (Kreutz 2010). Consequently, insurgents generally have a much 
stronger incentive to engage in peace talks than the government. This also means that 
if rebels are stronger and have access to resources, mediation can become less likely 
(Clayton 2013, 2016). Based on this presumed structural advantage, governments are 
likely to reject insurgent claims and pursue a military rather than a diplomatic 
solution. This advantage has the potential to become a disadvantage for governments; 
opening talks with insurgents can be interpreted as an admission that the government 
has lost control over its territory and lacks either the resolve or the capabilities, or 
both, to win the conflict militarily (Kaplow 2016; Melin and Svensson 2009). In 
effect it signals weakness. This can hurt governmentsÕ reputation with key domestic 
constituents and international partners as well as weaken their bargaining position 
versa insurgents. Furthermore, opening a dialogue recognizes insurgents and grants 
them legitimacy, which is difficult to obtain on the battlefield alone. Thus they stand 
to gain significant benefits by participating in a peace process, while the government 
suffers the cost of losing its position of being the sole legitimate power (Greig and 
Regan 2008; Melin and Svensson 2009). Consequently, governments will only open 
peace talks if the potential benefits of resolving a conflict outweigh the associated 
costs of the process (Melin and Svensson 2009).  
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 Theoretically, peace talks with the government can be costly to insurgents as 
they might alienate foreign donors, or, more importantly, cause internal splits 
weakening the group. Empirically, however, external support for rebels increases the 
likelihood of talks and domestic hardliners seem to have no effect (Kaplow 2016). 
The asymmetry in terms of legitimacy and military capability enables rebels to frame 
talks with governments as a success. Insurgents are not bound by audience costs the 
same way governments are because rebels can claim that their actions have forced the 
government to the table. Hence rebels generally welcome the opening of talks.  
  
Why do civil war parties use mediation?  
Mediation is a voluntary form of conflict management in which both sides grant an 
intermediary control over some feature(s) of the peace process. Mediation highlights 
both benefits and costs of bilateral dialogue. Rebels receive boosts in domestic and 
international legitimacy through the introduction of an intermediary, while 
experiencing little costs. For the state, however, it illustrates both its inability to 
control its territory and to withstand rebel pressure (Melin and Svensson 2009). 
Consequently, rebels might interpret acceptance of mediation as a signal that hard 
bargaining or continued fighting might lead to further concessions, which could 
increase support for rebels or encouraging new challengers (Toft 2003; Walter 
2006a). Admission of an intermediary implies a loss of autonomy for both 
belligerents. In sum, for rebels the benefits of mediation largely outweigh the costs. 
However, for incumbents who stand to lose their exclusive grip on political, 
economic, and/or territorial control, this presents a substantial cost. It harbors the 
chance that mediation results in a flawed agreement. These costs present strong 
disincentives for incumbents to engage in mediation.  
 Nonetheless mediation also offers benefits to governments. Foremost, it 
presents an effective tool to get out of violent conflict (Zartman 1995; Bercovitch and 
Gartner 2006; Beardsley et al. 2006; Beardsley 2011). Of course, the majority of 
states intend to defeat rebels. However, when defeating insurgents becomes less 
likely, mediation frequently presents the most effective way of ending the fighting. 
Contrastingly, governments might accept a mediation offer to re-group, collect 
information, or attack an unsuspecting adversary (Richmond 1998; Beardsley 2010). 
As conflict parties weigh expected costs against expected benefits of winning, the 
likelihood of mediation increases as a conflict becomes costlier (Clayton and 
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Gleditsch 2014). Accordingly, when governments face a serious threat they are more 
likely to participate in mediations (Clayton 2013, 2016; Clayton and Gleditsch 2014). 
Mediation is more likely when the desire to end violent conflict outweighs the costs 
of mediation. In civil wars the onset of mediation thus depends on the governmentÕs 
desire for peace balanced against the costs of admitting a third party, i.e. governments 
hold veto power over deciding the onset of mediation.  
 
Power to hurt and sexual violence 
Power to hurt is power to bargain 
Studies of dyadic interactions in conflict frequently draw on the notion of power to 
hurt as power to bargain (Hultman 2007; Wood 2010; Wood, Kathman, and Gent 
2012; Wood and Kathman 2014; Thomas 2014). This argument posits that the costs 
one disputant can impose on the other can be understood as leverage in the bargaining 
process. This implies that rebels do not need to win militarily to achieve their 
objectives; it can be enough to impose high costs to force incumbents to accept an 
intermediary. The underpinning idea is that rebels change governmentsÕ cost/benefit 
analysis of continuing armed conflict. In applying a gender lens, I extend this idea to 
argue that it is enough to publicly expose the stateÕs inability to protect its citizens 
from sexual violence. The inherent asymmetry between belligerents in civil war and 
incumbents as de-facto legitimate powers means that the power to hurt is a 
unidirectional mechanism. Put differently, rebels can employ hurtful tactics to force 
concessions (i.e. mediation) from states, but states cannot do the same to rebels. 
 Recent research corroborates the power to hurt argument by illustrating that 
relatively stronger rebels presenting a serious challenge to governments are more 
likely to force mediations (Clayton 2013, 2016; Clayton and Gleditsch 2014). Yet, 
even weak rebels can force governments to the negotiating table by targeting civilians 
and employing terrorist tactics (Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 2014). This is 
because targeting civilians improves insurgentsÕ bargaining position by signaling 
information about resolve and future conflict costs (Wood and Kathman 2014, 686). 
However, not all states are equally cost-sensitive, governmentsÕ level of 
accountability influences their susceptibility to hurtful tactics (Thomas 2014). The 
targeting of civilians is more likely to lead to talks in more democratic statesÑbut is 
this true for sexual violence? 
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Power to hurt through a gender lens 
Traditional power to hurt reasoning is gender blind and neglects individual 
experiences, particularly women who are persistently marginalized (Sylvester 2013). 
Thus extending feminist international relations theory to civil conflicts offers unique 
insights on how and why reports of rebels targeting civilians, particularly women, are 
perceived as hurtful to governments. In fact, feminist IR theory is crucial to 
understanding the gendered nature of sexual violence and the apparent contradiction 
of states perceiving reports of rebel sexual violence as hurtful while perpetrating such 
violence themselves.  
 Employing a gender lens draws on well-established feminist IR theory that 
argues that states are gendered (Peterson 1992; Tickner 1992, 2001; Sjoberg 2013). 
Formal institutions such as states are gendered when they Ôare symbolically and 
ideologically described and conceived in terms of a discourse that draws on 
masculinities and femininitiesÕ (Britton 2000, 420). States fit this pattern as they 
propagate masculine behavior in defending themselves, their citizens, territory, and 
identity (Sjoberg 2013). A feminist lens highlights that power, strength, and control 
are inherently tied to the gendered protection norm and the masculinity of states 
(Sjoberg 2013, 199; Karim and Beardsley 2017). Constituents frequently select for 
masculine leadership because they want and expect protection, strength, and power 
and they challenge leaders if they fail to meet these expectations (Sjoberg 2013, 162). 
This is visible in the executive branch and the defense ministries, which remain 
overwhelmingly male-dominated (Barnes and OÕBrien 2018). However, statesÕ 
masculinities are not uniform, but may take different forms such as ÔwarriorÕ, 
ÔprotectorÕ, or ÔemancipatorÕ (Sjoberg 2013; Karim and Beardsley 2017), meaning a 
military dictatorship might react differently to rebel sexual violence than a democratic 
government. 
 Fundamental to statesÕ masculinity is the gendered protection norm based on 
the separation of combatants and civilians along gendered lines (Carpenter 2003, 
2005; Sjoberg 2013; Karim and Beardsley 2017). Men are seen as natural protectors 
that ought to protect supposedly innocent civilians, i.e. women and children who are 
beautiful souls (Elshtain 1987). As such, states frequently (consciously or not) 
perceive women as both biological and cultural reproducers (Peterson 1999). 
Consequently, states prioritize the protection of these centers of gravity (Carpenter 
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2003, 2005). Accordingly, Ôcivilian victimization can be read as a proxy for 
Òwomen,Ó not as women per se but in their roles as the (gendered feminine) symbolic 
centerÕ (Sjoberg 2013, 201 emphasis in original). Targeting civilians in conflict to 
hurt the other side thus is fundamentally gendered. 
 This, however, does not imply that all victims of civilian victimization have to 
be female or that perpetrating agents intend to kill only women (Sjoberg 2013, 202). 
Equally, or even more important is the failed protector. The intentional targeting of 
civilians is primarily employed to symbolically hurt a presumed protector. A 
gendered understanding of the power to hurt argument thus posits that victimizing 
civilians targets the masculinity of oneÕs opponent. As Laura Sjoberg puts it, 
Ôintentional civilian victimization is, consciously or not, an attack on the masculinity 
(and therefore will to fight) of the enemy, carried out by the destruction of the 
feminineÕ (2013, 202). A failure to protect its women emasculates the state. 
 Sexual violence takes on a particular role in embodying the power to hurt 
mechanism for two reasons: (1) Unlike the killing of civilians, sexual violence is 
always committed intentionally (Mitchell 2004; Anderson 2010, 247), (2) sexual 
violence is inherently gendered as it draws on the gendered protection norm that 
renders women the center of gravity (Carpenter 2003, 2005; Sjoberg 2013; Karim and 
Beardsley 2017). The silencing of men as victims and survivors of sexual violence 
contributes to this framing. Sexual violence establishes both the literal and symbolic 
domination and subordination of the other in disarming and feminizing both the direct 
victim and the state (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2009). Benard describes how Serbian 
fighters raped women and children to shame and demoralize Bosnians by 
Ôdemonstrating them to be incapable of fulfilling their responsibility to protect 
vulnerable group membersÕ (1994, 40). To a state this emasculation presents a 
substantial conflict cost. I contend that sexual violence is so hurtful because it invokes 
the gendered protection norm to a greater extent than other forms of violence and 
thereby challenges a core aspect of a stateÕs masculinity.  
This emasculation of the state is exacerbated when the stateÕs failure to protect 
its women becomes public knowledge. Even isolated reports of sexual violence send a 
powerful signal because they expose statesÕ lack of territorial control and inability to 
protect civilians. Although governments (read elites) might not care about their 
people being victimized, they do care about their control, reputation, and projected 
   9 
strength (Walter 2006b).2 Rebel sexual violence fundamentally questions the stateÕs 
power. Thus it is not a concern for citizens that drives government reaction, but it is 
the perception that the state is ÔoutmannedÕ that hurts its pride. This connects to the 
fundamental self-conception of states that Ô[lay] claim to the monopoly of legitimate 
physical violence within a particular territoryÕ (Weber 2004, 33). Hence reports of 
sexual violence are deeply problematic for the state because they amplify its 
emasculation by exposing the stateÕs Ôincapacity to fulfill the fundamental masculine 
function of protectionÕ (Sjoberg 2013, 239). Thus it is a two-step process that 
emasculates the state: (1) the failure to protect its women, (2) the public knowledge of 
its failure. 
So why would emasculation prompt talks? I contend that first, the inherently 
gendered nature of sexual violence invokes the image of women and children in need 
of protection (Carpenter 2003, 2005) and triggers the gendered protection norm, 
which is fundamental to the masculine state identity, to a greater extent than for 
example one-sided violence. As a result their protection, i.e. cessation of hostilities 
and thereby an end of the stateÕs ongoing emasculation, becomes more important than 
retaliating. Second, rebel sexual violence does not occur in a vacuum, but in the 
context of an already costly conflict. Reports of sexual violence present an additional 
cost, rather than the only conflict cost. Third, it is not a deterministic argument. Some 
governments, particularly military regimes, might refuse to accept mediation and 
decide to fight back. States frequently try and fail to demonstrate strength and virility 
through fighting. As descriptive data show states are more likely to perpetrate sexual 
violence than rebels in a given conflict year (see Table I). The ongoing conflict itself 
illustrates, however, their inability to win militarily. Fourth, the weakness of 
accepting talks is short-lived while the conflict and sexual violence otherwise could 
drag on for months or years. Thus current and potential future costs of a prolonged 
emasculation outweigh the limited costs of a ÔfeminineÕ response in accepting talks. 
																																																								
2 I acknowledge that it matters which civilians are targeted. Sexual violence against 
ethnic minority civilians may not matter to the incumbent (if he is himself not of the 
same ethnicity). That is, the governmentÕs masculinity is not necessarily undermined 
by public knowledge of a failure to protect those civilians. I contend, however, that 
the stateÕs masculinity is bound to its ability to maintain territorial integrity, provide 
protection, and sole control over the means of violence. Empirically, the data also do 
not permit such a fine-grained analysis.  
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Put differently, the government could portray itself as the bringer of peace, stability, 
and possibly even reconciliation, which would mitigate the legacy of violence.  
The conflict in the Cte dÕIvoire that erupted in 2002 illustrates important 
aspects of this argument including that military and civilian leadership might differ in 
their responses to sexual violence. On 19 September, the rebellion led by the 
Mouvement Patriotique de Cte dÕIvoire (MPCI) assaulted three major cities Bouak, 
Korhogo, and the capital Abidjan. The government quashed the rebellion in Abidjan 
the same day, but rebels captured Bouak and Korhogo. In the course of this, MPCI 
fighters perpetrated rapes and abducted women into sexual slavery (Amnesty 
International 2007). The Defense Minister initially ruled out negotiations, which 
illustrates that militariesÕ reaction to such public humiliations might be a desire to 
fight even harder and to defeat the rebels Ð to prove their strength and virility Ð rather 
than engage in talks, which could be seen as being weak or as a further feminization. 
However, Prime Minister N'Guessan offered talks pledging to protect his citizens: 
ÒIvory Coast has not forgotten them, Ivory Coast has not abandoned themÓ (Rousseau 
2002). On 14 October, President Gbagbo condemned rape in the rebel-held territory 
calling for the international community to send observer missions to the rebel zones 
and offering full cooperation and the opening of a dialogue (Peytermann 2002). The 
talks mediated by the foreign ministers from the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) contact group officially began on 17 October in Lom, 
Togo (McCathie 2002). Based on this example and above discussion, I expect that 
mediation is more likely when rebels are reported to perpetrate sexual violence. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Mediation is more likely when there are reports of rebel sexual 
violence. 
  
 Although states and rebels are equally likely to perceive it as hurtful when it is 
known that the other side victimizes their constituents, the asymmetry between the 
two sides leads to different effects on mediation. Mediation requires the consent of 
both belligerents, yet the asymmetry in terms of political legitimacy affords 
governments veto power regarding the onset of mediation, meaning if it is not willing 
to talk, there will be no talks. Rebels might call for mediation when government 
forces perpetrate sexual violence against civilians who expect protection from rebels, 
but they do not have the political legitimacy or authority to initiate a mediation 
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process without the governmentÕs consent. The power to accept an external mediation 
offer lies in the hands of the government. Related to the stateÕs role as the sole 
legitimate political power is not only the implicit belief that it needs to fulfill a 
protective function, but importantly also the belief that it has a monopoly of force. 
Sexual violence by the state thus ought to be seen in the context of social and 
structural power relations (Meger 2016). This also means that sexual violence by the 
state itself can be in accordance with the stateÕs understanding of existing power 
relations and in fact expresses them. Violence is the stateÕs prerogative and its use is 
contingent on the stateÕs approval (Weber 2004, 33). Accordingly, I do not expect that 
reports of state sexual violence increase the likelihood of mediation. 
   
Hypothesis 2: Reports of state sexual violence do not affect the likelihood of 
mediation. 
 
Masculinity is not uniform and some governments adhere to more militarized 
masculinities than others. Hence not every government will respond to a perceived 
emasculation by engaging in mediation to end the conflict. A highly masculinized 
state such as a military regime would be more likely to see violence as the appropriate 
response and seek retaliation, especially as the conflict becomes more gendered and 
violent. The reaction of the Cte dÕIvoire Defence Minister ruling out talks with the 
rebels highlights the diverging effects that sexual violence might have on different 
types of leadership. Accordingly, I expect mediation to be less likely when rebels are 
reported to perpetrate sexual violence in conflicts against military regimes.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Mediation is less likely when rebels are reported to perpetrate sexual 




To test these hypotheses I draw on a mixed method approach using both systematic 
analysis and a crucial case study of Sierra Leone. For the systematic analysis I use the 
Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict (SVAC) dataset (Cohen and Nords 2014), and 
the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch, and Pospieszna 
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2011). Originally the unit of analysis of the CWM is conflict episode, whereas the 
SVAC dataset contains data on all conflict years from 1989 to 2009. To combine 
these datasets with their different units of analysis I manipulate both datasets. I split 
each conflict episode in the CWM into conflict years and coded the missing years 
(2005-2009) and I aggregate the SVAC data to conflict side per year, meaning that the 
incumbent government, pro-government militias, and supporting states comprise side 
A, ÔstateÕ, and that the rebel group(s) and supporting states comprise side B, ÔrebelsÕ.  
 After matching the datasets the unit of analysis is conflict year. I limit the 
analysis to the post-Cold War period from 1990 to 2009, which includes 746 
observations. Besides compatibility, a further benefit of using conflict years rather 
than conflict episodes is that it enables me to account for the variation in sexual 
violence over the course of a conflict and its effect on the likelihood of mediation 
onset. Mediation onset, the dependent variable, is binary. Therefore I use logistic 
regression models to estimate the likelihood of a mediation attempt in a conflict year. 
To account for a potential lack of independence of observations from the same 
country I cluster the standard errors by country. 
 
Dependent variable  
I adopt the definition proposed by the CWM of mediation as Ôa process of conflict 
management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, 
an individual, group, or state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their 
differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of lawÕ 
(Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991, 8). The dependent variable is a 
dichotomous variable that captures if a mediation process started in a conflict year (0 
= no mediation 1 = mediation). Adhering to common practice mediation is only coded 
1 for the year of the onset and as missing for subsequent calendar years if the process 
continues (Clayton 2013). This prevents counting one process multiple times and the 
analysis is confined to the onset of mediation. Of the 746 conflict years included, 222 
featured mediation. I do not include a measurement if the mediation process was 
concluded. Generally, mediation efficacy is difficult to define relying only on a binary 
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Table I. Mediation onset 
 
Mediation Frequency Percentage 
0 524 70.24 
1 222 29.76 




Sexual violence can take any of seven distinct forms (rape, sexual slavery, forced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization/abortion, sexual mutilation, and 
sexual torture) and is coded for every actor in a conflict year. The SVAC dataset 
includes three prevalence scores based on the three sources, State Department reports 
(SD), Amnesty International reports (AI), and Human Rights Watch reports (HRW) 
for each observation. For my analysis I aggregate these three prevalence scores to one 
score that takes on the value of 1 if there was any sexual violence reported for any of 
the three sources (prevalence scores 1, 2, and 3) and 0 if there was none in Model 1 
and Model 3. This allows me to establish that sexual violence is in fact public 
knowledge, while guarding against potential uncertainty in the reported prevalence. It 
is difficult to reliably identify the prevalence of sexual violence in conflicts. Hence 
researchers caution against the use of prevalence levels based on SD, AI, and HRW 
reports for quantitative analysis (Davies and True 2017). For Model 2 I nonetheless 
disaggregate the measure to distinguish between reports of some sexual violence and 
reports of widespread or systematic sexual violence. This analysis allows me to 
examine if the hypothesized relationship holds across reported levels of sexual 
violence. 
Data are available for 716 out of 746 conflict years. There is a pronounced 
asymmetry between reported sexual violence by states and rebels (Table II). States are 
reported to use at least some sexual violence in 318 (44.5%) out of 716 conflict years. 
Rebels on the other hand are reported to use sexual violence in less than 20% of all 
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Table II. Reports of sexual violence by states and rebels (%) 
 
  States  
  0 1 Total 
Rebels 0 362 (50.56) 221 (30.87) 583 (81.42) 
 1 36 (5.03) 97 (13.55) 133 (18.58) 
 Total 398 (55.59) 318 (44.41) 716 (100) 
 
 
 For H3, to determine if a government is a military regime, I draw on autocratic 
regime data (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). This enables me to distinguish 
between four different types of autocratic regimes: party regime, monarchy, 
personalist regime, and military regime. My sample includes 113 conflict years in 12 
different military regimes ranging from Algeria to Myanmar. To examine this 
hypothesis I construct an interaction term multiplying rebel sexual violence with 
military regime
3. When testing for the effect I thus include both component variables 




Conflict-related sexual violence now frequently attracts international attention. States 
and advocacy groups might bring to bear their normative and material influence to 
force the government into mediated talks. One potential avenue of influence is foreign 
aid (Carey, Colaresi, and Mitchell 2015). Democratic donor countries might attempt 
to hold receiving countries accountable for human rights abuses, while autocratic 
regimes are less likely to care about human rights abuses (Carey, Colaresi, and 
Mitchell 2015). The onset of mediation might not be driven by the governmentÕs own 
desire to end the conflict (and thereby sexual violence), but by the extent of the 
governmentÕs sensitivity to democratic donors. As reports of sexual violence are the 
crucial factor for donor states rather than the identity of the perpetrator, this implies 
that substantial foreign aid from democratic donors might prompt mediation if there 
are reports of sexual violence perpetrated regardless of the perpetratorÕs identity. 
																																																								
3 This includes military hybrid regimes such as Ôparty-militaryÕ or Ômilitary-personalÕ 
(Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). 
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Hence I control for the sensitivity to foreign democratic aid. To assess this I use 
Carey, Colaresi and MitchellÕs measure for democratic aid dependency: Ôthe natural 
log of the sum total of aid received as a proportion of the recipientÕs gross domestic 
productÕ (2015, 858). 
 I also control for factors known to influence the onset of mediation. Conflict 
duration presents one way of conceptualizing costs of fighting and has been linked to 
the onset of mediation (Filson and Werner 2007; Greig 2001). Accordingly, I include 
duration measured in years and duration squared to account for potential effects of 
conflictsÕ longevity on the likelihood of mediation. Besides conflict duration, conflict 
intensity can shape conflict partiesÕ choice of accepting mediation (Melin and 
Svensson 2009). Hence, I include the UCDP measure for intensity (0 = conflict years 
resulting in 25-999 battle-related deaths; 1 ≥ 1,000 casualties).  
 Parallel conflicts can influence the likelihood of mediation both positively and 
negatively. Multiple conflicts demand the state to divide its attention and resources, 
which should improve the rebelsÕ relative position and increase the likelihood of 
mediation. Multiple conflicts might also enlarge recognition costs of accepting 
mediation, which should reduce the likelihood of mediation. To account for both 
options I include a binary variable that indicates whether there are parallel conflicts in 
a country conflict year (0 = no parallel conflict; 1 = parallel conflicts). 
 Conflicts that draw in neighboring countries threaten to destabilize regional 
security and present a concern to the international community. As a result the 
internationalization of conflict frequently leads to attempts to contain or manage the 
conflict through mediated talks. Accordingly, I account for the type of conflict (0 = 
civil war; 1 = internationalized civil war).  
 Similarly, if there is a conflict in a neighboring country the international 
community might place greater emphasis on conflict management to stop a further 
destabilization of the region. Hence I include Carey, Colaresi and MitchellÕs (2015) 
dichotomous variable (0 = no conflict in neighboring countries; 1 = conflict in at least 
one neighboring country) to account for the effect of a conflict in a neighboring 
country on the likelihood of mediation.  
 When governments face strong rebels capable of challenging core government 
interests mediation becomes more likely (Clayton 2013, 2016; Clayton and Gleditsch 
2014). To control for this I use a measure of relative rebel strength from the Non-
State Actor Database (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2013). I use a binary 
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measure that estimates a rebel groupÕs strength in relation to the government (0 = 
weaker than the government; 1 = at parity with or stronger than the government).  
 To account for the possibility that mediation onset is forced through civilian 
victimization via lethal force rather than sexual violence I include a control for 
civilian deaths. I measure the impact of lethal violence against civilians on the 
likelihood of mediation using the natural logarithm of number of civilian deaths based 
on the UCDP One-sided Violence dataset 1.4-2016 (Eck and Hultman 2007).4  
 As democracies tend to be more peaceful than other forms of government I 
use the Polity IV data to include a democracy dummy (0 for a score < 6; 1 for a score 
≥ 6) to control for the possibility that whether a state is a democracy influences the 
chances of mediation. Lastly, I include the standard controls for economic 




The logistic regression model results are reported in Table III (parameters shown are 
logistic regression coefficients). They offer support for all three hypotheses. All other 
things being equal, mediation is more likely when rebels are reported to perpetrate 
sexual violence compared to when there are no reports of rebel sexual violence; 
government sexual violence shows no significant association with mediation onset; 
and mediation is less likely when rebels are reported perpetrating sexual violence 
against a military regime.  
 Relative rebel strength has a significant impact on the chances of mediation. In 
line with my theoretical expectations and previous studies rebel strength is a 
significant predictor for mediation onset, i.e. when rebels are at parity with or stronger 
than the government, mediation is more likely (Clayton 2013, 2016). One-sided 
violence, regardless of which side is perpetrating it, does not show a significant 
association with mediation onset. This supports the notion that rebel sexual violence 
is particularly hurtful and thus has a unique effect on a governmentÕs inclination of 
accepting mediation.   
																																																								
4 When a government is involved in multiple conflicts, the OSV data structure does 
not allow exact matching of government violence and conflict, hence I include a 
dummy variable to indicate if the government was reported to have perpetrated OSV 
against civilians in any of its conflicts. 
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 I also control for democracy, population size, GDP per capita, and sensitivity 
to international pressure via democratic foreign aid. The natural logarithm of the 
population size shows a negative association with the onset of mediation, meaning the 
bigger a countryÕs population the less likely mediation. Of the country-based control 
variables only democratic aid has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood of 
conflict management. This offers support to the notion that international pressure 
increases the likelihood of mediation. To further examine the relationship between 
sexual violence and international pressure I run interaction analyses. The interaction 
terms are all insignificant indicating that the effect of foreign aid on mediation onset 
is not connected to sexual violence and that the influence of international pressure and 
the influence of rebel sexual violence on mediation onset are independent of each 
other (see Appendix A for tables).  
 In Model 2 I disaggregate the measures of sexual violence to examine if the 
effect persists across reported levels of sexual violence. In this model I distinguish 
between reports of some sexual violence and reports of widespread/systematic sexual 
violence by the rebels or the government. The results show that the effect indeed 
holds for both reported levels of sexual violence. This also indicates that the results 
are neither driven by the majority of cases (83) in which rebels are reported to 
perpetrate some sexual violence nor the minority of cases (50) in which rebels are 
reported to perpetrate widespread or systematic sexual violence. Similarly, reports of 
government sexual violence remain insignificant regardless of the reported scale.  
 Examining H3 Model 3 shows that rebel sexual violence generally has the 
expected positive, statistically significant relationship with mediation onset. Whereas 
military regimes show no statistically significant relationship with mediation onset, 
i.e. they are not significantly less or more likely than other governments to engage in 
mediation. Importantly, however, the interaction term Rebel sexual violence x 
Military regime shows a negative, statistically significant association with mediation 
onset. This offers supports for H3 that mediation is less likely when rebels perpetrate 
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Table	III.	Logistic	regression	models	1-3	(DV	=	mediation	onset)	
	
 (1) (2) (3) 
Rebel SV 0.746**  1.044*** 
 (0.280)  (0.293) 
GovÕt SV 0.115  0.139 
 (0.268)  (0.270) 
Some rebel SV  0.696*  
  (0.291)  
Widespread rebel SV  0.921*  
  (0.402)  
Some govÕt SV  0.129  
  (0.266)  
Widespread govÕt SV  0.035  
  (0.436)  
Military regime   0.378 
   (0.675) 
Rebel SV x Military regime   -3.579** 
   (1.354) 
Duration 0.058 0.058 0.053 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.059) 
Duration2 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Intensity -0.102 -0.094 -0.065 
 (0.332) (0.332) (0.321) 
Parallel conflict 0.505 0.505 0.499 
 (0.414) (0.416) (0.413) 
Type of conflict 0.532 0.491 0.327 
 (0.440) (0.457) (0.405) 
Neighbor civil war -0.157 -0.153 -0.282 
 (0.348) (0.349) (0.352) 
Rebel strength 1.520** 1.529** 1.496** 
 (0.576) (0.571) (0.545) 
Rebel one-sided violence 0.002 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.058) (0.059) (0.054) 
GovÕt one-sided violence 0.274 0.301 0.270 
 (0.311) (0.304) (0.310) 
Democracy 0.660 0.673 0.874* 
 (0.426) (0.428) (0.415) 
Democratic aid 0.180* 0.179* 0.133t 
 (0.080) (0.079) (0.073) 
Autocratic aid -0.042 -0.041 -0.049 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.347 0.351 0.164 
 (0.235) (0.237) (0.244) 
Population (ln) -0.628*** -0.625*** -0.670*** 
 (0.172) (0.170) (0.166) 
Constant 7.940** 7.878** 8.824*** 
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 (2.613) (2.575) (2.535) 
AIC 619.457 623.114 599.359 
Area under ROC 0.760 0.761 0.778 
Wald-chi2 76.23(16) 76.37(16) 85.25(18) 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log likelihood -292.729 -292.557 -280.679 
N 564 564 554 
Standard errors in parentheses    




Logistic regression coefficients in raw form are difficult to interpret. They 
only provide substantial information on the direction and significance of the 
relationship, which in line with my argument is positive and significant, i.e. reports of 
sexual violence by rebels increase the likelihood of mediation. To provide further 
insight I present quantities of interest in the form of first differences as substantive 
effects based on Model 1 (Figure 1). The first difference plot shows changes in the 
predicted probability for mediation as the predictors move from minimum to 
maximum, while holding all else equal. In Model 1 rebel sexual violence is a 
dichotomous variable, i.e. it shows the change in the predicted likelihood between no 
reports of rebels perpetrating sexual violence and reports of rebels perpetrating sexual 
violence. The likelihood of mediation increases by 12% when rebels are reported to 
perpetrate sexual violence. Conflict years in which rebels are at least at parity with the 
government are 29% more likely to see the onset of mediation. Democratic aid also 
has a substantive effect; a change from the lowest amount of foreign aid from a 
democratic country to the highest amount increases the likelihood of mediation by 
22%.  
 
Figure 1. First difference plot Model 1 (95% confidence interval) 
   20 
 
 
To fully understand the substantive effects of the interaction between rebel 
sexual violence and military regimes I also provide the first difference plot for Model 
3 (Figure 2). Reports of rebel sexual violence in general maintain a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with mediation onset (Table III). However, when 
rebels are reported to perpetrate sexual violence in a conflict against a military regime 
it shows a statistically significant negative association with mediation onset. In such 
cases mediation onset is 13% less likely. Rebel strength and democratic aid show the 
same pattern of substantively increasing the likelihood of mediation. Figure 2 also 
shows that democratic countries are more likely to engage in mediations, further 
underscoring the importance of regime type. 
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To ensure the robustness of my findings, I run the principal models with different 
specifications and controls (see Appendix A for all tables). Control variables could 
insert a bias (Clarke 2005), therefore I run first a model limited to the independent 
variables rebel sexual violence and state sexual violence. This presents the same 
pattern as the principal models, positive and significant coefficient for reports of rebel 
sexual violence (p < 0.001) and an insignificant coefficient for reports of state sexual 
violence. 
 Theoretically, it is possible that when a government accepts mediation, 
thereby appearing weak, it reduces its ability to deter rebels from perpetrating sexual 
violence. I address this potential endogeneity by running models with lagged 
independent variables. The analysis shows the same pattern, positive and statistically 
significant coefficient for reports of rebel sexual violence (p < 0.05) and an 
insignificant coefficient for reports of government sexual violence. 
 To control for further endogenous effects of mediation, i.e. mediation while 
not succeeding in ending the conflict prompting a new mediation in the following 
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year, I include a dichotomous variable indicating whether there was mediation in the 
previous year (0 = no mediation previous year, 1 = mediation previous year). I run 
models using the same specifications as in Model 1 and Model 2. Mediation in the 
previous year is a significant predictor of mediation onset (p < 0.001), the binary 
measure of reports of rebel sexual violence is significant at the 0.1-level (p = 0.089). 
The analysis of the disaggregated measure of rebel sexual violence shows that if 
mediation occurred in the previous year, a renewed mediation onset is more likely 
when there are reports of widespread rebel sexual violence (p < 0.05), but not for 
lower levels of reported sexual violence. This is in line with the costly nature of 
mediation and the power to hurt argument. Once mediation has failed in the previous 
year, it takes a bigger cost, i.e. reports of widespread sexual violence, for the state to 
agree to mediation again.  
 The descriptive analysis shows rebel sexual violence is reported in less than 
20% of all conflict years under investigation. This implies the possibility that a small 
number of conflicts in which rebels are reported to perpetrate sexual violence might 
bias the results. Thus I run the models after excluding the five conflicts with the 
highest number of years featuring reports of sexual violence.5 The main results remain 
robust (p < 0.01). 
 Military interventions can influence the balance of power and conflict costs. 
This can shape forms and levels of violence, for example, biased interventions are 
associated with increasing levels of sexual violence (Johansson and Sarwari 2017) as 
well as the duration and outcome (Linebarger and Enterline 2016). Hence I run a 
robustness check controlling for biased interventions using data from Johansson and 
Sarwari (2017). Interventions do not show a statistically significant relationship with 
mediation onset and the association between rebel sexual violence and mediation 
remains unchanged.  
 Previous work on civilian victimization shows that terrorist attacks increase 
the likelihood of peace talks (Thomas 2014). To further examine this logic I replace 
rebel one-sided violence with measures of terrorist attacks in civil wars (Polo and 
Gleditsch 2016). Terrorist attacks do not show a statistically significant relationship 
with the onset of mediation. Results for rebel sexual violence remain virtually 
																																																								
5 The five excluded conflicts exhibiting highest number of years featuring reports of 
rebel sexual violence: Burundi, Sudan, Uganda, IndiaÕs Kashmir conflict, and Sierra 
Leone. 
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unchanged. This further supports the argument that rebel sexual violence is uniquely 
costly and thereby facilitates the onset of mediation compared to other forms of 
civilian victimization that could be hurtful to governments.  
In line with previous work (Thomas 2014), the main results show that the type 
of government matters for the onset of talks. To ensure that this is not simply a matter 
of autocratic governments being less cost sensitive and that military regimes are 
different to other autocratic regime types, I also run models interacting rebel sexual 
violence with democracy and replace military regime with personalist regime6. The 
democracy interaction term is insignificant suggesting that democratic accountability 
does not influence if reports of rebel sexual violence lead to mediation. In a 
personalist regime the dictatorÕs reputation is directly bound to his/her ability to offer 
protection and guarantee safety, meaning public reports of rebel sexual violence are 
personal humiliations. As a result I expect a personalist regime to be more susceptible 
to the emasculation effect of reported rebel sexual violence. The interaction term is 
positive and statistically significant at the 0.1-level (p = 0.08), suggesting that 
mediation is more likely when rebels are reported to perpetrate sexual violence in 
conflicts against personalist regimes. Taken together these results strongly support the 
emasculation argument. 
 
Evidence from the Sierra Leone civil war (1991-2002) 
The civil war in Sierra Leone is a crucial case for the proposed theory because rebelsÕ 
widespread perpetration of rape makes it the most likely case to observe the causal 
link between sexual violence and mediation onset. The evidence illustrates that the 
civilian government explicitly drew on the gendered notion of protecting vulnerable 
groups to justify its decision to hold peace talks with rebels, although they had 
brutalized civilians, unlike the temporary military regime, which hired a mercenary 
company to fight the rebels. A close examination of the temporal variation in sexual 
violence also helps address potential problems of reverse causality in the statistical 
analysis. The case study relies on data from a multitude of sources, including 
speeches by the President of Sierra Leone, data of violations reported by the Sierra 
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Gohdes and Ball 2010), memoires, 
international organization and NGO reports.  
																																																								
6 This refers to pure personalist regimes and excludes any personalist hybrid regimes.  
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Summary of the war 
Sierra LeoneÕs civil war erupted in 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
supported by Liberian rebel-leader Charles Taylor attacked areas around the eastern 
border with the goal of overthrowing the one-party state and holding multiparty 
elections. In 1992 disaffected soldiers staged a coup that overthrew the government 
and installed the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) led by Captain 
Valentine Strasser with the primary goal of stopping the rebels. The military regime 
of the NPRC failed to stop the rebels and in the mid-1990s the RUF started 
controlling diamond-rich regions as they closed in on the capital Freetown. In 
response the NPRC hired the mercenary company Executive Outcomes to fight the 
RUF. In 1995, the Sierra Leone WomenÕs Movement for Peace emerged as a crucial 
civil society actor that helped create the conditions for democratic elections (Kaldor 
and Vincent 2006). In 1996, relying on Executive Outcomes the NPRC established 
enough stability to hold elections that elected a civilian government, which signed an 
ECOWAS-mediated peace agreement in Abidjan in November 1996. In 1997, 
however, the side-lined military staged another coup exiling President Ahmad Tejan 
Kabbah to establish the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and inviting 
the RUF to join them. The same year an ECOMOG peacekeeping mission liberated 
Freetown and re-established President KabbahÕs civilian government. In January 
1999, still controlling large portions of the country the RUF launched what is now 
remembered as the 6 January invasion. The Civil Defence Forces and ECOMOG 
troops ultimately repelled the assault, but the two-week siege resulted in the highest 
numbers of reported rapes of the conflict and thousands of deaths. In July 1999, the 
government and the RUF signed a peace agreement mediated by ECOWAS leaders in 
Lom, Togo. Despite continued instability over the next two years, this proved to be a 
fundamental step towards the official end of the war in 2002.  
 
Wartime sexual violence and mediation 
Analysis of data obtained from the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission demonstrates that while lethal and sexual violence seem to be correlated, 
the highest number of killings was reported in the first year of the war 1991, and the 
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peak reported rapes in 1999 (Figure 3).7 This difference of incident numbers suggests 
that the effects of lethal and sexual violence might also differ. While sexual violence 
was reported in every year of the conflict, analysis shows two distinct peaks with 
large increases during two of the most intense years of the conflict: 1995 and 1999. In 
both cases the civilian government initiated mediation processes following peaks of 
rebel sexual violence (Figure 4). In 1995 intensive civil society mobilization, 
especially from women, was influential in creating conditions for democratic 
elections and impressing upon the NPRC the need to engage in a mediation process 
(Hayner 2007; Kaldor and Vincent 2006). Whereas the NPRC sought to win by all 
means including hiring mercenaries, the democratically elected government in 1996 
signed the ECOWAS-mediated agreement, which nonetheless failed to stabilize the 
country.  
Throughout 1998 the government attempted to defeat the rebels on the 
battlefield, rejecting the notion of peace talks. This abruptly changed after the RUF 
offensive in January 1999, in which rebels raped and abducted thousands of girls and 
women (Hayner 2007). The offensive was widely regarded as the Ômost intensive and 
concentrated period of human rights violationsÕ in the civil war (HRW 1999). 
Throughout the offensive rebels perpetrated widespread sexual violence including 
individual and gang rape, sexual assault with objects, and sexual slavery. This sparked 
a strong response from international organizations (HRW 2001). Under pressure from 
the international community, faced with relatively strong rebels, and its weakness 
exposed, the government renewed its peace efforts. 
 
																																																								
7 Data obtained from Gohdes and Ball (2010) Benetech/ABA-CEELI/Human Rights 
Data Analysis Group database of violations reported by the Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. As per the user agreement for the TRC dataset, I note 
that: ÒThese are convenience sample data, and as such they are not a statistically 
representative sample of events in this conflict. These data do not support conclusions 
about patterns, trends, or other substantive comparisons (such as over time, space, 
ethnicity, age, etc.)Ó Similar to Cohen (2016) I do use the data Ð combined with the 
other sources Ð to draw such conclusions.  
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Figure 3. Comparison of number of sexual violence and killing incidents 
 
 
Figure 4. Incidents of RUF sexual violence 
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Two weeks after RUF invasion of Freetown and throughout the following 
months President Kabbah repeatedly addressed the nation and the RUF calling for 
peace talks. His speeches reminded citizens of the Ôheinous barbarityÕ of the RUF, 
explicitly addressing the traumatizing rapes and the calls for surrender from 
government supporters. Carefully treading the line justifying both use of force and 
peace talks, the President above all stressed the importance of protecting citizens and 
finding a long-term solution: ÒLet me reassure you that while security and protection 
of our citizens have been and continue to be our primary concern, especially during 
the past few weeks, Government has never, ever abandoned the search for a peaceful 
settlement of the conflictÓ (Kabbah 1999a). He appealed to the RUF to free abducted 
children, emphasizing their status as innocent civilians. Such calls for the protection 
of vulnerable groups, i.e. women and children, are deeply gendered (Carpenter 2005) 
and serve to reinforce the paternal protector position of the government (Young 
2003). In these speeches the invasion of Freetown was a constant reminder of how the 
RUF had exposed the governmentÕs weakness and inability to protect its citizens:  
 
ÒThis is why we appeal to the RUF, their allies, arms suppliers, and 
supporters, to immediately release our children, including those whom 
they abducted during their invasion of our capital in January this year. 
We say to them: PLEASE, LET OUR CHILDREN GO! RELEASE 
THEM IMMEDIATELY!Ó (emphasis in original Kabbah 1999b) 
 
The widespread sexual violence during the two-week siege intensified 
international pressure for a peaceful resolution. Starting in late January 1999, 
regional, international actors such as the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-
General for Sierra Leone, and civil society actors including the Inter-Religious 
Council and WomenÕs Movement lobbied both President Kabbah and RUF leader 
Sankoh to negotiate (Okai et al. 2014). In May, ECOWAS-mediated talks began in 
Lom, Togo, which ended in the July agreement. President Kabbah took an 8-year old 
girl whose mother had been murdered and who had an arm amputated by rebels with 
him to the signing ceremony (Penfold 2012, 151), a gesture that reminded the people 
of Sierra Leone of the horrors of the civil war and his role as their protector in ending 
the atrocities. Observers deemed Kabbah sincere and righteous, but politically 
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inexperienced and weak (sic!) for relenting to international pressure to accommodate 
RUF demands (Penfold 2012). Human Rights Watch held the lenient amnesty 
provisions in the Lom agreement responsible for creating an atmosphere of impunity 
(2001). Importantly, however, the timeline clearly shows that neither the mediation 
nor the agreement caused the sexual violence.  
 
Discussion 
This study contributes to both the expanding body of literature focusing on mediation 
in civil wars and sexual violence in armed conflict. Mediation is more likely when 
rebels are reported to perpetrate sexual violence because public knowledge of this 
victimization threatens statesÕ masculinity by exposing governmentsÕ lack of control 
and power. Accordingly, governments seek to stop the conflict and thereby sexual 
violence via mediation, which supports preceding work that shows that governments 
respond to the victimization of their citizens (Thomas 2014; Wood and Kathman 
2014). This study provides more evidence of the importance of analyzing the dyadic 
interactions within conflicts and the value of detailed disaggregated data in furthering 
this cause. It also fills an important gap in our understanding of how sexual violence 
affects the outcome of civil wars (Chu and Braithwaite 2018) and the role of sexual 
violence in conflict more generally. 
 The findings indicate a perverse incentive structure whereby rebels benefit 
from perpetrating sexual violence, while not supporting the notion that international 
pressure is more influential in conflicts in which belligerents use sexual violence. The 
results, however, also show that third party interventions do take place in response to 
abuses by rebels. This indicates a general willingness to intervene in the face of 
severe human rights abuses, particularly when perpetrated by rebels, which highlights 
the need to pay more attention to statesÕ abuses. The dominant narrative of sexual 
violence as a weapon of war gained international prominence over the past decade 
after the UN Security Council passed resolution 1820 in 2008, which explicitly named 
sexual violence as an instrument of war (Crawford 2017). As this study is limited to 
conflicts up to 2009, it will be important for future studies to examine what effect this 
increased attention has on the prevalence of sexual violence or any unanticipated 
effects of exacerbating sexual violence by rebels (Autesserre 2012; Meger 2016). It 
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also highlights the importance of gendered analyses of conflicts and strengthens calls 
for greater gender sensitivity in mediation efforts (OÕReilly and î Silleabhin 2013). 
 Identifying the best moment for a diplomatic intervention is crucial to its 
success (Greig 2001). Reports of rebel sexual violence seem to be an important 
indicator of ÔripenessÕ as conflict management and negotiated agreements are 
significantly more likely (Chu and Braithwaite 2018). Potential intermediaries thus 
should pay close attention to international reports of sexual violence by rebels and 
coordinate their mediation offers accordingly to maximize the chances of initiating a 
process. Although mediation cannot and should not be equated with ÔripenessÕ or 
conflict resolution, often reaching the table is a critical first step towards 
comprehensive resolution. 
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